By Brooke Spens
Abstract/Introduction
In the modern era, surveillance practices have been used for various purposes from tracking a significant other to monitoring individuals’ data to generate profit. Through extensive research efforts, patterns surrounding the utilization of intrusive surveillance tools and instances of co-opting technology by those with malicious intent have emerged; the disproportionate targeting of women by digital means to control and censor the individual is one such example. This work depicts patterns of the weaponization of gender in the digital sphere and its characteristics, oftentimes reliant upon the exploitation of restrictive societal norms within the region. This writing aims to define a spectrum of technology-facilitated abuses used to monitor, intimidate, and harass women globally, ranging from surveillance deployed against an intimate partner to the use of surveillance tools by state and state-like actors. The broad spectrum of surveillance-facilitated targeting, along with specific case studies of abuse covered, signals an alarming trend that threatens the autonomy of women and necessitates further research.
Intimate Surveillance
The initial stage within our spectrum of gendered surveillance practices is classified as intimate surveillance. Within our research, intimate surveillance is characterized as surveillance of intimate relationships through digital means, typically occurring within the home. Areas of intimate surveillance can include online stalking, sexual behaviors, unwanted contact and harassment, fertility, and revenge.[1] This section will focus on surveillance in intimate partner relationships; however, it is worth noting that the scope of intimate surveillance can span beyond romantic relationships to include subordinate tracking such as parental and employee tracking.[2]
While not all surveillance of intimate partners is malicious in nature, surveillance technologies can enable the monitoring and control of an individual’s behaviors in an intimate partner abuse context. Intimate partner surveillance and stalking oftentimes occurs alongside other forms of domestic abuse including those physical and psychological. In the United States, the percent of women who experience intimate partner violence (IPV) is one in three compared to one in six for men.[3] The rate of domestic abuse is similar in the United Kingdom with an estimated 27.1% of women experiencing domestic abuse.[4] According to research, “81% of women who were stalked by current or former partners also experienced physical [intimate partner abuse] IPA.”[5] Electronic monitoring of victims has been shown to ensure compliance and serve as a construct of coercive control used by abusers.[6]
Methods of surveillance within intimate relationships vary in technical complexity. Techniques utilized include co-optation of technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices, spyware, applications, and device/account compromise and ownership among others. As IoT devices become commonplace, an increasing level of interconnectedness permeates throughout the household at a level previously unthought of.[7] Perpetrators can use specific features in IoT devices such as audio and visual recording, location tracking, and activity logs to further harass and control a victim.[8] Threat modeling research of an IoT smart lock conducted by Leonie Tanczer and others demonstrates how the extension of the internet into the physical environment creates exploitative avenues relating to IPV to remotely control devices and networks in turn negatively impact victims/survivors.[9]
A second category within surveillance technologies are applications with a legitimate purpose known as “dual-use” apps. These apps, for example “Find My Friends,” offer active location tracking for connected individuals.[10] The term “dual-use” denotes the ability of abusers to repurpose the app functionalities for the intent of intimate partner surveillance.[11],[12] In the case of “Find My Friends,” the app can be used consensually to monitor friends, family, and partners for legitimate reasons; however, if the tracking is enabled without the user’s consent and knowledge, it can become a gross intrusion of a person’s privacy as a tool to actively surveil their location.
Contrast to dual-use apps, other apps are explicitly marketed as spyware designed to covertly monitor and track an individual and their device. These apps are surreptitiously installed on a victim’s phone and can have the capability to access location information, SMS activity, audio and visual features, and phone logs. One group of researchers conducted a Google web crawl of search results modeled after a person attempting to engage in intimate partner surveillance (IPS) in order to study spyware use in intimate partner relationships.[13] Through this research, 70 apps with spyware IPS capabilities were identified and investigated. Notable apps included HelloSpy, FlexiSpy, Retina-X, Mysms, iKeyMonitor, ATTI Shadow Tracker, Cerberus and others. All listed IPS apps share features that can be co-opted by abusers, a point supported by reviews of their software with “103 reviews on 82 apps that explicitly mention that the app is used for tracking or spying on a current or previous intimate partner.”[14] One such review reads “Love it! I can now keep an eye on my possibly cheating wife!,” with five people marking it as “helpful.”[15] Other apps like HelloSpy boast marketing materials of men physically assaulting women followed by text encouraging the necessity of keeping an eye on your spouse.[16] The development of new technologies with varying degrees of complexity that can be used to monitor, intimidate, and harass women globally represent the everchanging threat of intimate surveillance that begins to establish the initial spectrum of gendered surveillance.
Intimate surveillance presents a unique security challenge given the proximity between the person surveilling and the surveilled. Standard security and privacy measures are prone to fail due to the intimate knowledge that is shared in a close relationship. The examples included in this section are a limited sample of the techniques used in an IPS setting to coerce and control an individual. These challenges necessitate measures to safeguard the privacy and autonomy of those surveilled to protect against intimate digital surveillance.
Surveillance Capitalism
The intermediate scale is composed of gender’s role in surveillance capitalism. Surveillance capitalism is defined by Shoshana Zuboff as “‘[a] new economic order that claims human experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales” and “[a] movement that aims to impose a new collective order based on total certainty.’”[17] Surveillance capitalism refers to corporations’ widespread harvesting and commodification of personal data. To generate profit, social media and other tech companies rely heavily on collecting and selling personal data.[18] Users’ demographic information, for example a user’s gender, is sold to advertisers which serve as determinants to inform the targeted advertisements presented to the user.[19] Advertisers employ “probabilistic matching” to connect users to their devices and target ads across their digital ecosystem.[20] Through this method, individuals are inundated with data-informed advertisements spanning platforms and devices. Practices of surveillance capitalism may disproportionately impact women, with sociologist Rosalind Gill more broadly stating “‘surveillance of women’s bodies . . . constitutes perhaps the largest type of media content across all genres and media forms.’”[21] The beginning of computerized personal data saw a rise in advertisements on distinctly feminine issues as women’s data was commodified and sold by data brokers to target female consumers.[22] A trend that has likely grown as women exceeded men in social media use as of 2000.[23]
One area subject to the intensified gaze of surveillance capitalism is women’s reproductive systems. The term femtech has been coined to describe an industry marketing women’s health technology products.[24] The femtech industry has capitalized off the collection and sale of billions of their user’s intimate health data points from their contraception use to their sexual habits.[25] Online advertisement campaigns can include recommended contraceptives and egg-freezing ads on Instagram, to at-home hormone testing kits for women.[26] One area with a sizeable market share is reproductive applications such as Glow and Flo offering services to track periods and pregnancy and collect intimate information including medications, cramps, illnesses, sexual experiences, miscarriages, and stillbirths.[27] The Fight for Privacy by Danielle Citron notes that women and girls are 75% more likely than men and boys to use health apps with more than 100 million women and girls.[28] As of 2025, the femtech global market size is estimated at 60.89 billion USD and forecasted to be 130.80 billion USD by 2034.[29] Moreover, following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization which ended the constitutional right to abortion, women have feared the use of their reproductive data as a means to incriminate them.[30] One method of particular concern is the practice of geofencing; geofencing is used by advertisers to manipulate advertisements based on a user’s location.[31] This practice has allowed the digital targeting of women at abortion clinics subjecting them to advertisements of abortion alternatives prompted by geofencing conducted by anti-abortion groups.[32] The case of abortion is one instance where surveillance capitalism can harm the autonomy and privacy of women. The vast amount of data collection displays the concerning trend of utilizing intrusive personal data for financial gain, oftentimes without the express and understood consent of the individual.
There is overlap between characteristics of surveillance capitalism and intimate surveillance; however, surveillance capitalism differs from intimate surveillance due to the scope and nature of surveillance. The intent behind intimate surveillance largely revolves around profit as opposed surveillance of a person by a partner for the purpose of control. One case study is the femtech app Glow. The data user’s input into Glow, and similar applications, provide a window into the private, intimate reproductive health of its users from their last period and phase of their menstrual cycle to the possibility of conception. Relating to intimate surveillance, this information could be used by an individual to establish greater control over their partner. The likelihood of which is increased through prevalent “partner integration” features in the app that encourage connecting with partners by touting the phrase “Achieving your reproductive goals is a team effort.”[33] The app sends personalized reminders to the connected partners with recommendations for habits like level of alcohol consumption and underwear choices. These features open a potential avenue for misuse by partners with ramifications for individual privacy and security.
The discussion on the disproportionate nature of surveillance capitalism and its impact on women, as exemplified through the femtech industry in this writing, represents merely a fraction of ethical surveillance considerations in the modern era. Shoshana Zuboff articulates the gravity of this discussion in writing, ‘“[u]nequal knowledge about us produces unequal power over us, and so epistemic inequality widens to include the distance between what we can do and what can be done to us.”’[34] As trends of data collection and exploitation become normalized, the necessity to consider the implications of such practices in order to safeguard our intimate information becomes critical, particularly for vulnerable populations.
State Level Surveillance
The final section delineated in the spectrum of gendered surveillance-facilitated targeting is the utilization of surveillance technologies by state or state-like actors to control and censor women, practices that consistently rely on the exploitation of restrictive societal norms within the region. Authoritarian states utilize state surveillance to monitor, track, and collect data on the behaviors of an individual or group of people. They aim to suppress dissent and exert control over their citizens in what is known as digital authoritarianism. Research has indicated patterns of the weaponization of gender within the borders of authoritarian states and transnationally. Authoritarian regimes have recognized the value in targeting women due to repressive, traditional hierarchal structures and the preservation of gender norms.[35] The list of global perpetrators for these practices is extensive; reported facilitators include state actors, government sponsored media and trolls, and loyalist diaspora groups. Specific targeting techniques deployed include social media surveillance on popular platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram, intrusive hacking attempts through phishing attacks and spyware, as well as online harassment through the exploitation of personal explicit images, trolling, and defamatory narratives.[36]Cases of women experiencing these methods, and the resulting implications on women’s lives will be detailed subsequently.
By targeting a woman’s body, family, values, or reputation, regimes aim to discredit and limit the visibility of women they deem as threats to their authoritarian control.[37] Women who have influential power such as human rights defenders, activists, and journalists are likely targets. The Citizen Lab conducted extensive research on the weaponization of gender for the purposes of digital transnational repression. Digital transnational repression is the use of digital technologies by governments to surveil and intimate individuals in the diaspora.[38] One such case is the story of Bahraini-Danish activist Maryam al-Khawaja who has been continually surveilled following her work on Bahraini human rights issues and advocacy for her father’s release as a political prisoner.[39] Maryam left Bahrain following threats of arrest, however, the state-sponsored surveillance has persisted during her exile in Denmark. She has been harassed on online platforms such as Twitter where she has faced online defamatory campaigns including sexual shaming, tactics aimed at discrediting her Muslim identity, and falsified abortion rumors in attempts to delegitimize her work.[40] The pervasive harassment has made her hesitant to use the platforms she relies on for her human rights advocacy work. Maryam also believes her devices have been targeted by state-sanctioned spyware, further compounding the level of scrutiny she is subject to. Maryam’s abuse has transitioned from the digital space to the physical space where she has encountered physical stalking, a characteristic that is common for women in cases like these.[41] Taken together, these practices have made Maryam fear for her safety, the safety of her family, and her professional connections. It has impacted her psychological and social well-being, and amplified concerns of her future activism.[42] The real-world implications of surveillance at the state level against dissidents demonstrates a concerning trend of invasive technology perpetuating autocratic centralized control.
The tendency for perpetrators to target women is further supported by cases of targeting by association; a number of women have been targeted due to their proximity to a male member of civil society deemed threatening by authoritarian government. For example, the wife of Azerbaijani activist Ilkin Rustamzade, Amina Rustamzade, was subject to an aggressive online smear campaign in an attempt to silence her husband’s activism.[43] Amina’s contact information and intimate photos were shared online and on escort websites where she was relentlessly harassed and threatened. Due to the traumatizing experience, Amina attempted to take her own life.[44] Her story indicates the detrimental impact these pervasive campaigns have on women’s lives.
Governments have employed surveillance tactics to maintain state narratives at the expense of the rights of civil society. The stories of Maryam and Amina are two examples of a plethora of women who have been unfairly targeted in the digital space due to online expression. Women classified as high-profile targets, or those with close proximity to male targets, have experienced relentless harassment through online sexual shaming and surveillance tactics, many of which are effective due to conservative societal structures. This section has introduced the misuse of digital surveillance technologies by authoritarian governments to maintain state control and the resulting implications on women.
Conclusion
The rise of technology in daily life has been accompanied by alarming trends of the surveillance of women. For the purpose of this writing, surveillance has been classified into three sections: intimate surveillance, surveillance capitalism, and state level surveillance. While these groupings share overlapping characteristics, each has distinct patterns that exhibit the broad, gendered dynamic of current surveillance practices. Mechanisms from social media, IoT devices, health apps, and commercial spyware actively present privacy threats to women globally, many with the ability to be co-opted for malicious purposes. The disproportionate targeting of women in the digital sphere, from the deployment of intimate surveillance tools to femtech data collection and state-sponsored online harassment, serve as a call to action to recognize and address the violations of privacy and security experienced by women globally.
Aljizawi, Noura, Siena Anstis, Marcus Michaelsen, Veronica Arroyo, ShailaBaran, Maria Bikbulatova, Gözde Böcü, et al. “No Escape: The Weaponization of Gender for the Purposes of Digital Transnational Repression,” December 2, 2024. https://citizenlab.ca/2024/12/the-weaponization-of-gender-for-the-purposes-of-digital-transnational-repression/.
Anstis, Siena, and Émilie LaFlèche. “Gender-Based Digital Transnational Repression as a Global Authoritarian Practice.” Globalizations ahead-of-print, no. ahead-of-print (2024): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2024.2401706.
“ATTI Shadow Tracker,” 2025. https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.wgpss.shadowTrackerMobile&hl=en_US.
“Azerbaijan — Stop the Vicious Campaign of Gendered Smears and Reprisals against Women Activists,” May 12, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/05/azerbaijan-stop-the-vicious-campaign-of-gendered-smears-and-reprisals-against-women-activists/.
Chatterjee, Rahul, Periwinkle Doerfler, Hadas Orgad, Sam Havron, Jackeline Palmer, Diana Freed, Karen Levy, Nicola Dell, Damon McCoy, and Thomas Ristenpart. “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), May 20, 2018, 441–58. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.00061.
Citron, Danielle Keats. The Fight for Privacy. W. W. Norton & Company, 2022.
Dardis, Christina M., Courtney Ahrens, Rebecca L. Howard, and Mindy B. Mechanic. “Patterns of Surveillance, Control, and Abuse Among a Diverse Sample of Intimate Partner Abuse Survivors.” Violence Against Women 27, no. 15–16 (2021): 2882–2909. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801220975497.
Freed, Diana, Jackeline Palmer, Diana Minchala, Karen Levy, Thomas Ristenpart, and Nicola Dell. “‘A Stalker’s Paradise’:How Intimate Partner Abusers Exploit Technology,” n.d.
Gill, Rosalind. “Surveillance Is a Feminist Issue,” 148–61, 2019. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315728346-10.
“Glow,” 2025. https://glowing.com/?srsltid=AfmBOoq8VS4C2XdP1duT2J4xPef9x28dSeLNrIENr2CW58U8KEtlsnQq.
Hajkova, Alzbeta, and Tom A. Doyle. “Hacking the Cycle: Femtech, Internalized Surveillance, and Productivity.” Philosophy & Technology 37, no. 4 (2024): 123. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00801-4.
Levy, Karen E.C. “Intimate Surveillance.” Idaho Law Review, n.d.
Lu, Conan. “Abortion in the Age of Surveillance Capitalism.” Harvard Political Review, April 28, 2023. https://harvardpolitics.com/abortion-in-the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism/.
Mandryk, Regan, Mark Hancock, Mark Perry, Anna Cox, and Roxanne Leitão. “Digital Technologies and Their Role in Intimate Partner Violence.” Extended Abstracts of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2018, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1145/3170427.3180305.
Pandey, Deepa. “Femtech Market Size, Share, and Trends 2025 to 2034,” January 30, 2025. https://www.precedenceresearch.com/femtech-market#:~:text=The%20global%20femtech%20market%20size%20was%20estimated%20at%20USD%2055.86,8.88%25%20from%202025%20to%202034.
Peters, Sasha. “Surveillance Capitalism How Targeted Ads Solidify the Gender Binary.” Systemic Justice Journal, 2021. https://systemicjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Peters_FinalPaper.pdf.
Rizzo, Jessica. “Asking for It: Gendered Dimensions of Surveillance Capitalism.” Emancipations, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55533/2765-8414.1010.
Slupska, Julia, and Leonie Maria Tanczer. “Threat Modeling Intimate Partner Violence: Tech Abuse as a Cybersecurity Challenge in the Internet of Things.” The Emerald International Handbook of Technology-Facilitated Violence and Abuse, 2021, 663–88. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83982-848-520211049.
[1] Karen E.C. Levy, “Intimate Surveillance,” Idaho Law Review, n.d. Karen E.C. Levy, “Intimate Surveillance,” Idaho Law Review, n.d. Levy, “Intimate Surveillance.” Click or tap here to enter text.
[2] Rahul Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence,” 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), May 20, 2018, 441–58, https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.00061. Rahul Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence,” 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), May 20, 2018, 441–58, https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.00061. Click or tap here to enter text.
[3] Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.”
[4] Regan Mandryk et al., “Digital Technologies and Their Role in Intimate Partner Violence,” Extended Abstracts of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2018, 1–6, https://doi.org/10.1145/3170427.3180305.
[5] Christina M. Dardis et al., “Patterns of Surveillance, Control, and Abuse Among a Diverse Sample of Intimate Partner Abuse Survivors,” Violence Against Women 27, no. 15–16 (2021): 2882–2909, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801220975497.
[6] Dardis et al., “Patterns of Surveillance, Control, and Abuse Among a Diverse Sample of Intimate Partner Abuse Survivors.” Dardis et al., “Patterns of Surveillance, Control, and Abuse Among a Diverse Sample of Intimate Partner Abuse Survivors.”
[7] Julia Slupska and Leonie Maria Tanczer, “Threat Modeling Intimate Partner Violence: Tech Abuse as a Cybersecurity Challenge in the Internet of Things,” The Emerald International Handbook of Technology-Facilitated Violence and Abuse, 2021, 663–88, https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83982-848-520211049. Click or tap here to enter text.
[8] Slupska and Tanczer, “Threat Modeling Intimate Partner Violence: Tech Abuse as a Cybersecurity Challenge in the Internet of Things.” Slupska and Tanczer, “Threat Modeling Intimate Partner Violence: Tech Abuse as a Cybersecurity Challenge in the Internet of Things.” Click or tap here to enter text.
[9] Slupska and Tanczer, “Threat Modeling Intimate Partner Violence: Tech Abuse as a Cybersecurity Challenge in the Internet of Things.”
[10] Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.”
[11] Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.”
[12] Diana Freed et al., “‘A Stalker’s Paradise’:How Intimate Partner Abusers Exploit Technology,” n.d. Click or tap here to enter text.
[13] Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” Click or tap here to enter text.
[14] Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.”
[15] “ATTI Shadow Tracker,” 2025, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.wgpss.shadowTrackerMobile&hl=en_US.
[16] Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.” Chatterjee et al., “The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence.”
[17] Sasha Peters, “Surveillance Capitalism How Targeted Ads Solidify the Gender Binary.,” Systemic Justice Journal, 2021, https://systemicjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Peters_FinalPaper.pdf. Click or tap here to enter text.
[18] Peters, “Surveillance Capitalism How Targeted Ads Solidify the Gender Binary.”
[19] Peters, “Surveillance Capitalism How Targeted Ads Solidify the Gender Binary.”
[20] Peters, “Surveillance Capitalism How Targeted Ads Solidify the Gender Binary.”
[21] Rosalind Gill, “Surveillance Is a Feminist Issue,” 2019, 148–61, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315728346-10
[22] Jessica Rizzo, “Asking for It: Gendered Dimensions of Surveillance Capitalism,” Emancipations, 2023, https://doi.org/10.55533/2765-8414.1010.
[23] Rizzo, “Asking for It: Gendered Dimensions of Surveillance Capitalism.” Rizzo, “Asking for It: Gendered Dimensions of Surveillance Capitalism.”
[24] Alzbeta Hajkova and Tom A. Doyle, “Hacking the Cycle: Femtech, Internalized Surveillance, and Productivity,” Philosophy & Technology 37, no. 4 (2024): 123, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00801-4.
[25] Danielle Keats Citron, The Fight for Privacy (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022). Danielle Keats Citron, The Fight for Privacy (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022). Citron, The Fight for Privacy. Danielle Keats Citron, The Fight for PrivacyCitron, The Fight for Privacy.Citron, The Fight for Privacy. Citron, The Fight for Privacy.
[26] Rizzo, “Asking for It: Gendered Dimensions of Surveillance Capitalism.”
[27] Citron, The Fight for Privacy.
[28] Citron, The Fight for Privacy. Citron, The Fight for Privacy. Citron, The Fight for Privacy. Citron, The Fight for PrivacyCitron, The Fight for Privacy. Citron, The Fight for Privacy. Citron, The Fight for Privacy.
[29] Deepa Pandey, “Femtech Market Size, Share, and Trends 2025 to 2034,” January 30, 2025, https://www.precedenceresearch.com/femtech-market#:~:text=The%20global%20femtech%20market%20size%20was%20estimated%20at%20USD%2055.86,8.88%25%20from%202025%20to%202034.Click or tap here to enter text.
[30] Conan Lu, “Abortion in the Age of Surveillance Capitalism,” Harvard Political Review, April 28, 2023, https://harvardpolitics.com/abortion-in-the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism/.
[31] Lu, “Abortion in the Age of Surveillance Capitalism.”
[32] Lu, “Abortion in the Age of Surveillance Capitalism.”
[33] “Glow,” 2025, https://glowing.com/?srsltid=AfmBOoq8VS4C2XdP1duT2J4xPef9x28dSeLNrIENr2CW58U8KEtlsnQq.
[34] Peters, “Surveillance Capitalism How Targeted Ads Solidify the Gender Binary.”
[35] Noura Aljizawi et al., “No Escape: The Weaponization of Gender for the Purposes of Digital Transnational Repression,” December 2, 2024, https://citizenlab.ca/2024/12/the-weaponization-of-gender-for-the-purposes-of-digital-transnational-repression/.
[36] Aljizawi, Noura, Siena Anstis, Marcus Michaelsen, Veronica Arroyo, ShailaBaran, Maria Bikbulatova, Gözde Böcü, et al. “No Escape: The Weaponization of Gender for the Purposes of Digital Transnational Repression,” December 2, 2024. https://citizenlab.ca/2024/12/the-weaponization-of-gender-for-the-purposes-of-digital-transnational-repression/.
[37] Siena Anstis and Émilie LaFlèche, “Gender-Based Digital Transnational Repression as a Global Authoritarian Practice,” Globalizations ahead-of-print, no. ahead-of-print (2024): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2024.2401706.
[38] Aljizawi et al., “No Escape: The Weaponization of Gender for the Purposes of Digital Transnational Repression.”
[39] Aljizawi et al., “No Escape: The Weaponization of Gender for the Purposes of Digital Transnational Repression.”
[40] Aljizawi et al., “No Escape: The Weaponization of Gender for the Purposes of Digital Transnational Repression.”
[41] Aljizawi et al., “No Escape: The Weaponization of Gender for the Purposes of Digital Transnational Repression.”
[42] Aljizawi et al., “No Escape: The Weaponization of Gender for the Purposes of Digital Transnational Repression.”
[43] “Azerbaijan — Stop the Vicious Campaign of Gendered Smears and Reprisals against Women Activists,” May 12, 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/05/azerbaijan-stop-the-vicious-campaign-of-gendered-smears-and-reprisals-against-women-activists/.
[44] “Azerbaijan — Stop the Vicious Campaign of Gendered Smears and Reprisals against Women Activists.”
Leave a Reply