By Brooke Spens, Ishaanvi Saini, Abigail Yared, and Halima Islam
Abstract
In recent months, the proliferating surveillance capabilities of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have made headlines ranging from the alleged use of cell-site simulators to Palantir data mining systems. Surveillance technologies contracted and deployed by ICE extend beyond typical immigration enforcement with some researchers claiming its operations are more similar to those of a “domestic surveillance agency.”[1] This blog post analyzes the mobilization of mass data collection and monitoring by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement while weighing privacy and human rights considerations.
Introduction
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has been regarded as the primary agency responsible for law enforcement related to cross-border crime and immigration since 2003. To conduct operations, ICE deploys a sweeping surveillance ecosystem that has proliferated alongside the federal government’s increased focus on immigration policy. Reports indicate the scope of surveillance extends beyond the standard understanding of immigration enforcement and results in the information of many American citizens being collected.[2] Subsequent sections outline specific technical targeting used by ICE. These methods include data mining, the procurement of personal state records, Palantir-designed AI system ImmigrationOS, and the acquisition of the commercial spyware Graphite.[3] Moreover, this post situates ICE’s operations within the U.S. immigration legal environment and examines the potential for human rights and privacy harms manufactured by the ever-lengthening arm of ICE surveillance operations. This blog post denotes the need for well-grounded concern arising from the consequences of a vast domestic surveillance apparatus that threatens the fundamental rights of citizens and noncitizens alike.
Technical Targeting Mechanisms
The technical targeting of ICE relies on several overlapping technical tools. Examples of these technologies include cell site stimulators that mimic tower signals, intrusive spyware including Graphite. Graphite is developed manufactured by spyware firm Paragon and can extract encrypted messages and audio from mobile devices.[4] Enterprise data analytic/AI-enabled and platforms from Palantir merge government and commercial records for near real-time targeting, leveraging systematic social media scraping with access to department of motor vehicles (DMV) records and brokered utility data.[5] Collectively, use by ICE constitutes a surveillance network that collects from a wide range of “targets” with minimal accountability. Below, each of these tools or techniques is examined in more detail.
Stingray, vehicle-mounted cite-simulator, acts as a fake cell tower to identify and locate mobile devices and their associated users by tricking the device into connecting to the system and providing sensitive location data.[6] Stingray is effective in tracking individuals but its collection is proximate not specific, meaning that the technology collect information from nearby all nearby phones that attempt to connect to this fake cellular tower. The device is indiscrete within its proximate radius and can result in the surveillance of surrounding U.S. persons without a valid warrant, risking a violation of the 4th amendment.[7]constitutes a search that presents serious privacy concerns.[8]
ICE signed a $2 million contract in 2025 with Paragon Solutions to enable zero-click intrusions into smartphones.[9] Paragon spyware can take complete control over the target’s phone once installed. It can access encrypted communications, files, and even microphones. In short, transforming personal devices into pervasive surveillance node.[10]
Data collected from these tools feeds into the analytical platforms similar to those developed by Palantir like, FALCON, and ImmigrationOS. These platforms integrate information from immigration databases, biometric systems, and communication metadata to generate detailed individual profiles and predictive leads.[11] While systems like this increase operational efficiency, the underlying algorithms operate with minimal transparency and oversight, increasing the likelihood of bias, misclassification, and false targeting.[12] ICE’s indirect acquisition of data by purchasing data from state and commercial sources which includes DMV records, utility subscriptions, and private data brokers further deepens and widens its surveillance gaze. Big data collection and analysis provide the agency with the ability to track and map individuals absent oversight mechanisms in legal or contractual frameworks. The result is a normalization of the constant monitoring of U.S. persons across digital infrastructures and data repositories.
Social media surveillance by ICE is also expanding rapidly. In addition to hiring analysts to scan platforms like Facebook, X, TikTok and Instagram, ICE is launching a new Social Media Intelligence Program.[13] This program will support deportations through round-the-clock monitoring.[14] This expanded program will expand the continuous scanning of online content, and result in enhanced lead generation, and instant flagging of individuals for potential enforcement actions (deportations). The expansion of this program brings with it potential negative externalities including, targeting, collection, and enforcement errors, and fosters an environment of fear that discourages free speech among immigrant communities and allied communities.
Collectively, these tools constitute a transformation of ICE surveillance into a data driven model that merges technology, policing, and foreign and domestic intelligence activities. Although officials justify each tool as necessary for national security and border control,[15] their collective use blurs the line between targeted investigation and domestic surveillance. The result of these expanded capabilities is a growing subversion of 4th amendment rights for U.S. persons and increasingly serious concerns about privacy and accountability.
Ramifications
The surveillance infrastructure described in the last section has continued to expand, extending ICE’s reach beyond vast data systems and automated targeting tools and into the daily lives of migrants. This transition became particularly evident in 2018, when U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement piloted a new surveillance program as part of its Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program, most notably through the BI SmartLINK app.[16] Advocates including immigrant right activists, attorneys, and community-based support workers who support migrants throughout their immigration proceedings, describe “alternative to detention” methods as a form of “digital detention” that extends ICE’s powers beyond physical walls.[17] New surveillance modalities combine with individualized surveillance programs, such as electronic ankle monitors, in-person check-ins, and home visits, to essentially create an Orwellian surveillance infrastructure. This expansion of surveillance has deeper impacts on human and civil rights, as digital border technologies enable constant observation, thus rendering it increasingly difficult for migrants to navigate their daily lives. [18]
For immigrants, the effects are personal and pervasive. An advocate explained that their clients live in “a great deal of just kind of constant anxiety that they’re gonna get redetained or that they’re gonna get deported,” while others lose jobs because apps like BI SmartLINK send out unexpected check-ins during work hours, involving facial verification, location tracking, voice recognition, etc.[19] Digital border technologies amplify these issues by turning standard digital traces, like meta-data from apps, geolocation from photos, and everyday online interactions, into methods to classify people as potential “risky travelers,” despite having no record, charges, or behaviors that indicate risk. The growth of data-driven control exacerbates the social and psychological effects described by advocates. Migrants withdraw from friendships, avoid public spaces, and police their own movements because they fear that everyday actions might draw attention or hurt their cases. These effects intensify as ICE’s larger surveillance network connects biometric records, state databases, and commercial data sources, giving the agency access to parts of lives that were never meant to be places of enforcement.
Modern surveillance doesn’t just analyze data; it builds profiles and constructs people using bits of information, like travel details, restaurant bookings, and app activity, to treat the profile as more authentic than the person behind it.[20] When these generated risk signals are entered into systems that use commercial data brokers and even reports from “watchful neighbors,”[21] migrants can be seen as security threats even when nothing in their behavior warrants suspicion. This suppression of humanity, which turns individuals into “dividuals” composed of digitized fragments creates human and civil rights ramifications that manifest long before any formal decision is made, influencing how migrants speak, move, and exist under a system capable of misinterpreting them without their knowledge.[22]
ICE surveillance now includes U.S. persons as well. Data-sharing among ICE, local law enforcement, and private contractors allows for the tracking of millions of U.S. persons, both citizens and noncitizens.[23] We are moving towards a future in which digital surveillance becomes standard for all, regardless of citizenship status. For immigrants already navigating an unfamiliar nation, the feeling of being constantly watched creates feelings of anxiety, loneliness, and a lack of control. The more mechanisms of surveillance become automated and prevalent, the concerns surrounding misinterpretation and overreach will continue to worsen, especially within immigrant communities.
Legal Considerations
“The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”[24]
The above words are verbatim from the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, implying that when law enforcement unreasonably searches and seizes a person, their property, or their biometric data, it violates this Amendment, regardless of the individual’s citizenship status. From a legal perspective, the development of Alternatives to Detention (ATD) programs and other related surveillance initiatives does not mitigate constitutional concerns. While the program is “civil” by definition,[25]” its structure and enforcement mirror the criminal system from which it claims to be different, further substantiated by the fact that several immigration detention center’s use infrastructures invested by organizations like The GEO Group, an establishment that develops and endorses private prisons and mental health facilities.[26] When a ‘civil’ program limits “privacy, autonomy, and freedom of association,”[27] it comes alarmingly close to unlawful detention, which is the very thing that habeas corpus was meant to protect against.
A recent empirical study examining legal perspectives in U.S immigration enforcement revealed that several constitutional concerns are brought into question when considering the operation of immigration detention centers and the surveillance component deeply rooted in the monitoring initiatives. Attorneys claimed there was a “complete denial of liberty” and that “legal mail is now being scanned…in ways that violate the constitution,”[28] which puts attorney-client privilege and due-process rights at risk. These statements demonstrate that surveillance goes beyond the mere observation of migrants and instead includes their legal counselors as well, illustrating what Needle and Fleischmann describe as a more extensive “surveillance assemblage” that obscures legal boundaries and undermines protections within the immigration system.
In 2014, Anil Kalhan, a professor of law at Drexel University foresaw the trajectory of U.S. immigration enforcement and warned that if digital surveillance and tools kept growing without limits, they would increase in power and weaken due process protections. [29] Now, over a decade later, his message resembles a plan. IDENT and its replacement HART, as well as Palantir-built systems like Investigative Case Management (ICM) and FALCON, now connect immigration control data pipes. These pipes are a combination of records from federal, state, local, and commercial levels into one enforcement illustration. These platforms don’t just pull files from the DHS and FBI, but they also scan DMV photos with facial recognition, license plate readers, and pull in subscription feeds from private data brokers.[30] Essentially, this means that local law enforcement and immigration agencies can use everyday records, such as credit or insurance records as intake.[31] Georgetown’s American Dragnet: Data-Driven Deportation in the 21st Century report reveals that ICE spends a large sum of money to regularly access and connect DMV records and other forms of data. Additionally, recent DHS privacy assessments describe how Palantir’s tools benefit field agents and case analysts.[32] In practice, this framework makes the “migration border”[33] thicker, by expanding border control into standard digital systems that track migrants beyond just the physical boundary.
Screening and tracking don’t just take place at ports of entry; they also occur within the country where local arrests or routing paperwork can spread through connected systems.[34] That adjustment is crucial because it brings immigration control into everyday life, where getting a license, paying a bill, or being stopped for a minor offense can all be added to a file. Considering policies and accountability aren’t developing as fast as technology, power is growing faster than oversight. Interoperability, when one agency instantly has access to data collected by another,[35] has made surveillance consistent and omnipresent by connecting systems, but the oversight and due process that should come with this access are often lacking.
Conclusion
The proliferating methods of surveillance deployed by ICE in the United States present a clear concern to both constitutional and human rights. Measures deployed by ICE range from obtaining personal state records through data brokers, to more invasive forms of surveillance technologies such as spyware.[36] Palantir is one such company discussed previously notorious for their sweeping approach to obtaining personal information through systems such as FALCON and ImmigrationOS, in which mass amounts of data are condensed to create a detailed profile of a person.[37] As these systems expand, data from routine digital traces is being utilized progressively more to make speculation about an individual’s intent or risk level, which affect enforcement actions, such as unwarranted arrests and detainment.[38] While surveillance capabilities continue to grow, so does the risk of their misuse, threatening the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures for individuals, regardless of citizenship status.[39] This blog post has analyzed the invasive digital mechanisms that have consistently undermined the privacy of both U.S citizens and noncitizens, with implications that extend into the physical world through the increased risk of detention. What this expansion ultimately makes clear is that ICE’s surveillance infrastructure no longer just observes people; it also changes the limits of safety and privacy around them.
American Immigration Council. “Alternatives to Immigration Detention,” 2023. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/report/alternatives-immigration-detention-overview/.
Bennett, Nicole. “Always Watching: How ICE’s Plan to Monitor Social Media 24/7 Threatens Privacy and Civic Participation,” 2025. https://chicagodefender.com/always-watching-how-ices-plan-to-monitor-social-media-24-7-threatens-privacy-and-civic-participation/.
Camacho, Pedro. “ICE Eye New Social Media Intelligence Program to Support Deportations With Round-the-Clock Monitoring: Report,” The Latin Times, 2025. https://www.latintimes.com/ice-eyes-new-social-media-intelligence-program-support-deportations-round-clock-monitoring-590178.
Congress, U.S. “Fourth Amendment.” Constitution Annotated, Library of Congress, 1791.
Dou, Eva. “ICE Amps up Its Surveillance Powers, Targeting Immigrants and Antifa.” The Washington Post, October 17, 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/10/17/ice-surveillance-immigrants-antifa/.
Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “ICE Bought Vehicles Equipped with Fake Cell Towers to Spy on Phones.” Tech Crunch, 2025. https://techcrunch.com/2025/10/07/ice-bought-vehicles-equipped-with-fake-cell-towers-to-spy-on-phones/.
———. “ICE Reactivates Contract with Spyware Maker Paragon.” Tech Crunch, September 2, 2025. https://techcrunch.com/2025/09/02/ice-reactivates-contract-with-spyware-maker-paragon/.
Hardman, Heath. “The Brave New World of Cell-Site Simulators.” Albany Government Law Review 8 (2015).
Hubbard, Steven. “ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants’ Movements.” American Immigration Council, August 21, 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/.
Institute, Legal Information. “50 U.S. Code Chapter 36 Subchapter I – Electronic Surveillance.” Legal Information Institute. Accessed January 7, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/electronic_surveillance.
Kalhan, Anil. “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy.” Ohio State Law Journal 74, no. 6 (2013): 1105–66.
Kyrylenko, Veronika. “ICE Reactivates Contract With Israeli-Linked Spyware Firm Paragon.” New American, 2025. https://thenewamerican.com/us/tech/ice-reactivates-contract-with-israeli-linked-spyware-firm-paragon/.
Mills, James. “ICE’s Expansive Surveillance Tool Monitors Hundreds of Websites and Apps.” Criminal Legal News, 2025. https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2025/apr/15/ices-expansive-surveillance-tool-monitors-hundreds-websites-and-apps/.
Muniz, Ana. “Bordering Circuitry: Cross Jurisdictional Immigration Surveillance.” U.C.L.A. Review 66, no. 6 (2019): 1636–81. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/uclalr66&i=1694.
Needle, Jessica P., and Kenneth R. Fleischmann. “Lawyers’ Perspectives on Surveillance in U.S. Immigration Enforcement.” Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology 61, no. 1 (2024): 266–76. doi:10.1002/pra2.1026.
O’Dea, Dan. “The StingRay You’ve Never Heard Of: How One of the Most Effective Tools in Law Enforcement Operates Behind a Veil of Secrecy,” 2021. https://mjlst.lib.umn.edu/2021/11/30/the-stingray-youve-never-heard-of-how-one-of-the-most-effective-tools-in-law-enforcement-operates-behind-a-veil-of-secrecy/.
O’Flaherty, Kate. “New iPhone Spyware Warning — Act Now To Prevent Attacks,” 2025. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2025/06/13/new-iphone-spyware-warning—act-now-to-prevent-attacks/.
Owens, Kentrell, Yael Eiger, Basia Radka, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Franziska Roesner. “Understanding Experiences with Compulsory Immigration Surveillance in the U.S.” Proceedings of the 2025 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 2025, 887–99. doi:10.1145/3715275.3732057.
Petti, Matthew. “What Is ICE Doing with This Israeli Spyware Firm.” MSN, 2025. https://www.msn.com/en-us/technology/software/what-is-ice-doing-with-this-israeli-spyware-firm/ar-AA1M8j3F.
Saunders, Natasha. “Security, Digital Border Technologies, and Immigration Admissions: Challenges of and to Non-Discrimination, Liberty and Equality.” European Journal of Political Theory 24, no. 2 (2025): 155–75. doi:10.1177/14748851231203912.
Walsh, James P. “Watchful Citizens: Immigration Control, Surveillance and Societal Participation.” Social & Legal Studies 23, no. 2 (2014).
———. “Watchful Citizens: Immigration Control, Surveillance and Societal Participation.” Sage Journals, 2014. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/0964663913519286.
Wang, Nina, Allison McDonald, Daniel Bateyko, and Emily Tuck. American Dragnet: Data-Driven Deportation in the 21st Century, 2025. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/publications/american-dragnet-data-driven-deportation-in-the-21st-century/.
Wang, Nina, Allison McDonald, Daniel Bateyko, and Emily Tucker. American Dragnet: Data-Driven Deportation in the 21st Century. Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law. Washington, DC, 2025. https://americandragnet.org/.
[1] Nina Wang, Allison McDonald, Daniel Bateyko, and Emily Tuck, American Dragnet: Data-Driven Deportation in the 21st Century, 2025, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/publications/american-dragnet-data-driven-deportation-in-the-21st-century/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Eva Dou, “ICE Amps up Its Surveillance Powers, Targeting Immigrants and Antifa,” The Washington Post, October 17, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/10/17/ice-surveillance-immigrants-antifa/.
[4] Kate O’Flaherty, “New iPhone Spyware Warning — Act Now To Prevent Attacks,” 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2025/06/13/new-iphone-spyware-warning—act-now-to-prevent-attacks/.
[5] Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “ICE Bought Vehicles Equipped with Fake Cell Towers to Spy on Phones,” Tech Crunch, 2025, https://techcrunch.com/2025/10/07/ice-bought-vehicles-equipped-with-fake-cell-towers-to-spy-on-phones/.
[6] Dan O’Dea, “The StingRay You’ve Never Heard Of: How One of the Most Effective Tools in Law Enforcement Operates Behind a Veil of Secrecy,” 2021, https://mjlst.lib.umn.edu/2021/11/30/the-stingray-youve-never-heard-of-how-one-of-the-most-effective-tools-in-law-enforcement-operates-behind-a-veil-of-secrecy/.
[7] Legal Information Institute, “50 U.S. Code Chapter 36 Subchapter I – Electronic Surveillance,” Legal Information Institute, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/electronic_surveillance.
[8] Heath Hardman, “The Brave New World of Cell-Site Simulators,” Albany Government Law Review 8 (2015).
[9] Veronika Kyrylenko, “ICE Reactivates Contract With Israeli-Linked Spyware Firm Paragon,” New American, 2025, https://thenewamerican.com/us/tech/ice-reactivates-contract-with-israeli-linked-spyware-firm-paragon/.
[10] Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “ICE Reactivates Contract with Spyware Maker Paragon,” Tech Crunch, September 2, 2025, https://techcrunch.com/2025/09/02/ice-reactivates-contract-with-spyware-maker-paragon/.
[11] Steven Hubbard, “ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants’ Movements,” American Immigration Council, August 21, 2025, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/.
[12] Matthew Petti, “What Is ICE Doing with This Israeli Spyware Firm,” MSN, 2025, https://www.msn.com/en-us/technology/software/what-is-ice-doing-with-this-israeli-spyware-firm/ar-AA1M8j3F.
[13] Nicole Bennett, “Always Watching: How ICE’s Plan to Monitor Social Media 24/7 Threatens Privacy and Civic Participation,” 2025, https://chicagodefender.com/always-watching-how-ices-plan-to-monitor-social-media-24-7-threatens-privacy-and-civic-participation/.
[14] Pedro Camacho, “ICE Eye New Social Media Intelligence Program to Support Deportations With Round-the-Clock Monitoring: Report,” The Latin Times, 2025, https://www.latintimes.com/ice-eyes-new-social-media-intelligence-program-support-deportations-round-clock-monitoring-590178.
[15] James Mills, “ICE’s Expansive Surveillance Tool Monitors Hundreds of Websites and Apps,” Criminal Legal News, 2025, https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2025/apr/15/ices-expansive-surveillance-tool-monitors-hundreds-websites-and-apps/.
[16] Kentrell Owens et al., “Understanding Experiences with Compulsory Immigration Surveillance in the U.S.,” Proceedings of the 2025 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 2025, 887–99, doi:10.1145/3715275.3732057.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Natasha Saunders, “Security, Digital Border Technologies, and Immigration Admissions: Challenges of and to Non-Discrimination, Liberty and Equality,” European Journal of Political Theory 24, no. 2 (2025): 155–75, doi:10.1177/14748851231203912.
[19] Owens et al., “Understanding Experiences with Compulsory Immigration Surveillance in the U.S.”
[20] Saunders, “Security, Digital Border Technologies, and Immigration Admissions: Challenges of and to Non-Discrimination, Liberty and Equality.”
[21] James P. Walsh, “Watchful Citizens: Immigration Control, Surveillance and Societal Participation,” Social & Legal Studies 23, no. 2 (2014).
[22] Saunders, “Security, Digital Border Technologies, and Immigration Admissions: Challenges of and to Non-Discrimination, Liberty and Equality.”
[23] James P. Walsh, “Watchful Citizens: Immigration Control, Surveillance and Societal Participation,” Sage Journals, 2014, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/0964663913519286.
[24] U.S. Congress, “Fourth Amendment,” Constitution Annotated, Library of Congress, 1791.Ibid.
[25]“Alternatives to Immigration Detention,” American Immigration Council, 2023, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/report/alternatives-immigration-detention-overview/.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Jessica P. Needle and Kenneth R. Fleischmann, “Lawyers’ Perspectives on Surveillance in U.S. Immigration Enforcement,” Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology 61, no. 1 (2024): 266–76, doi:10.1002/pra2.1026.
[28] Ibid.
[29]Anil Kalhan, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy,” Ohio State Law Journal 74, no. 6 (2013): 1105–66.
[30] Nina Wang, Allison McDonald, Daniel Bateyko, and Emily Tucker, American Dragnet: Data-Driven Deportation in the 21st Century, Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law (Washington, DC, 2025), https://americandragnet.org/.
[31] Ana Muniz, “Bordering Circuitry: Cross Jurisdictional Immigration Surveillance,” U.C.L.A. Review 66, no. 6 (2019): 1636–81, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/uclalr66&i=1694.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Kalhan, “Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy.”
[34] Saunders, “Security, Digital Border Technologies, and Immigration Admissions: Challenges of and to Non-Discrimination, Liberty and Equality.”
[35] Muniz, “Bordering Circuitry: Cross Jurisdictional Immigration Surveillance.”
[36] Wang, McDonald, Bateyko, and Tuck, American Dragnet: Data-Driven Deportation in the 21st Century.
[37] Hubbard, “ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants’ Movements.”
[38] Walsh, “Watchful Citizens: Immigration Control, Surveillance and Societal Participation,” 2014.
[39] Congress, “Fourth Amendment.”